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A QUESTION OF TRUST
Carl Miller
Well-placed trust is a vital social good. It is foundational to a
healthy democracy, and necessary for human beings to work
confidently with one another. A lack of trust increases social
frictions and collective endeavour. Understanding trust is
vital to understand society: to know how messages are
received, how organisations and processes are interacted 
with, and why – individually and collectively – we make 
the choices and live the lives that we do. It is an important
part of social science, and a vital requirement of informed
public policy. 
We have long tried to measure and understand trust:
major national polls have measured trust in politicians,
organisations and the professions for decades. But these
techniques are criticised for only measuring trust as an
abstract and general thing: trust is often highly contextual
and dependent on situation. The rise of social media offers an
opportunity to study trust in a new way. As we use new digital
platforms, we create large new bodies of information about
what we think, what we experience and who we are. A
burgeoning new discipline – social media science – attempts
to rigorously and ethically research social media to
understand society. 
This report uses new technologies and research methods
to ask whether the study of Twitter can allow us to
understand trust more contextually, constantly and ethically.
It scopes the quality and quantity of trust-relevant data on
Twitter, the ability of emerging technologies to accurately
measure them, and, overall, whether this new form of research
can add to our understanding of trust, and how it relates to
the standard principles of good research and sound evidence. 
Carl Miller is Research Director at the Centre for the Analysis
of Social Media at Demos. 
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Trust
Many things we hold to be true, we can neither discover nor
prove ourselves. Claims about the world often rely on specialised
or esoteric knowledge, on information that we cannot access, or
on experiences that we have not had. We often rely on other
people and institutions – experts, governments, journalists, our
friends and family – to decide what is true and false, to make
decisions and take actions.1
We believe secondhand knowledge because of who
provides it. When we believe people and institutions are capable
and able sources, and also ones acting with credibility and
integrity, we ‘trust’ them. Trust is one of the most important
concepts for explaining each of our intellectual and moral
worlds, and our relationship with the people, institutions,
technologies and processes that surround and shape our lives.
When well placed, trust is a social good, foundational to a
healthy democracy, and vitally necessary for human beings to
work confidently with one another. Holding trust is an
important asset for governments, organisations and individuals.
Reasonable scepticism and criticism of institutions and
individuals is important: to hold the powerful to account, to
challenge conventions, to produce new solutions, and to enable
genuine choice. However, when mistrust is high and generalised,
it is harmful. It increases friction in society, makes interactions
between people more difficult, and undermines the capacity of
government to benefit the people it serves.2
Measuring trust is important to understand society, to know
how messages are understood, how organisations and processes
are interacted with, and why individually and collectively we
make the choices that we do. It is an important part of sociology,
and a vital requirement of informed public policy.
The measurement of trust
Trust is an elusive concept as well as an important one. Like
other concepts that we use to explain the social world, it is
abstract and intangible. It cannot be measured directly, but only
– indirectly – through social behaviours that imply or indicate it.
These are called ‘trust indicators’.3
A range of disciplines – psychology, psephology,
anthropology, medicine, computer science and sociology –
measure trust using a variety of indicators. Some ways of
researching trust are highly individual: extended interviews,
diaries and logs. Others are based on group discussions or
observing key parts of natural life as they unfold. Large society-
wide attempts to measure trust use structured techniques to ask
people questions and record their responses in the form of polls.
These are conducted regularly in an attempt to understand and
measure the extent of our trust in governments, organisations
and individuals around us, and how it changes. Polling
companies, for instance, are especially interested gathering a
representative national picture of trust, especially in politics,
politicians, important institutions and the major professions. The
polling company Ipsos MORI has systematically measured
general public trust in professions since 1983, as has YouGov
since 2003.4 Eurobarometer, the biannual survey undertaken for
the European Commission, measures trust in national
governments, parliaments and the European Union.5
While polls are the most widely used method to measure
trust, they have important weaknesses. In her 2002 Reith
lectures on trust, the philosopher Onora O’Neill argued that
trust is highly dependent on context and situation, and that we
trust some kinds of people or institutions in some matters, some
of the time, but not all of the time.6 Polls struggle to grasp this
context. They are expensive, difficult to conduct constantly, and
often necessarily involve – in the act of polling – lifting people
out of the day-to-day context where trust really exists. O’Neill
complained that when asking generic questions about trust, polls
smooth out the important everyday distinctions that sit at the
heart of what trust really is.
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Social media
Over the last five years, the way we communicate with each other
has changed dramatically. Around the world, 1.2 billion people
use an app or website to generate as well as consume
information.7 Social media is now the most popular activity on
the internet.8 In the UK, 48 per cent of British adults use a social
networking site, and this number is growing rapidly.9 The
explosion of social media has radically changed where and how
we live our lives, and how we talk about the experiences we have
had and the attitudes that we hold.
The growth of social media has opened up new
opportunities to study the social world. The recent Demos paper
Vox Digitas argued that a new research technique – ‘digital
observation’ – could be used to understand attitudes from
Twitter, a social media platform that allows users to create
accounts and post ‘tweets’ to its site.10 Tweets are small micro-
blogs, and can only contain a few short sentences, pictures or
links. Twitter has been operating since 2006 and its 200 million
active users have posted over 170 billion tweets since the
platform was first created. Around 10 million of these users are
British.11 Twitter makes many of these tweets available for
researchers. Taken together – Vox Digitas argued – Twitter created
and released data that were large, constantly refreshing, and
sociologically rich. This new space could be systematically
researched to uncover more information about our attitudes than
ever before.12
Research Questions
This paper examines whether it is possible to learn more about
trust through researching Twitter. It addresses three central
challenges: data, technology and theory.
Data: are indicators of trust produced by Twitter?
Twitter’s users now produce 500 million tweets per day. These
Tweets are produced for a number of reasons, have a wide variety
of functions, and are on a broad range of topics. First, do these
tweets contain indicators of trust? If so, what kinds of indicators
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exist, in what contexts, quantities and qualities, and in relevance
to what issues?
Technology: can indicators of trust be reliably measured?
Second, if indicators of trust exist, could they be dependably
collected, counted, measured and differentiated? This is a
question of determining the reliability of social media 
research methodology.
Twitter often produces datasets that are too large to be read
manually. They overwhelm conventional social scientific
methods for analysing them. This paper employs a new method
– digital observation – which uses computer-based techniques to
handle very large bodies of data. However, these techniques are
unfamiliar in social research, and carry with them new
implications and consequences. This paper will therefore
examine whether it is possible to collect and measure indicators
of trust dependably, using this technology. For a fuller
description of the methodology see the section ‘Method’ below,
and the methodology annex.
Theory: does researching Twitter advance our understanding 
of trust?
The third challenge is the most fundamental and important.
Given the datasets that Twitter produces, and the ability of
researchers to collect and analyse them, does studying Twitter
improve our overall understanding of trust? This question opens
up a number of issues about the broader place of social media
research within social science. They cannot be conclusively
addressed within the scope of this – or indeed any current –
research, but are important to raise here to contextualise what
else is found.
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The structure of the report
The report addresses the three research questions set out above
through three case studies. Each introduces a different context
wherein trust is important.
Case study 1 looks at political trust in the claims and
statements of individuals who hold political office. Political trust
is especially necessary and important, but conventional polls
suggest it is currently deficient.13
Case study 2 considers official trust. It is important to
understand trust in the large, impersonal processes and
institutions that shape people’s lives. This case study looks at
trust directed towards selected official organs of the British
Government.
Case study 3 addresses event-based trust. This sort of trust
is not related to a particular individual or institution but instead
to a specific event. Trust between countries is vitally important,
especially for maintaining international norms, agreements and
treaty regimes. The event selected in the case study focuses on a
trust-based controversy – the disputed violation of a treaty by
Russia, a country in which trust is deeply divided.14
Method: digital observation
This section describes how digital observation was used to
collect, analyse and interpret tweets related to trust.
Data collection – the application programming interface
Researchers collected one set of tweets for each case study via
Twitter’s ‘stream’ and ‘search’ application programming interface
(API), which allows researchers to collect publicly-available
tweets. The ‘search API’ returns a collection of relevant tweets
from an index that extends up to roughly a week in the past. The
‘stream API’ continually produces tweets that contain one of a
number of keywords for the researcher, in real time as they are
made.15 For each case study, a set of words was created based on
a manual review of Twitter conversations before data collection.
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Data analysis – the ‘classifier’
Twitter produces datasets too large to be analysed manually or
understood in their totality. Digital observation was developed as
a method capable of handling datasets of this kind. It uses
natural language processing (NLP) ‘classifiers’, which are
algorithms trained by analysts to recognise the linguistic
difference between different categories of language. This training
is conducted using a technology developed by the Centre for the
Analysis of Social Media called Method51, which allows non-
technical analysts to train and use classifiers.16 For a full
description of Method51 and the training of classifiers, see the
methodology annex.
The assessment of classifiers
The accuracy of each classifier used for this paper was measured
by comparing the classifications given to 100 randomly selected
tweets by a computer classifier and human analyst. These
comparisons are recorded to show the number of times the
algorithm made the same decisions as a human (and therefore
was correct), and the number of times it did not (and was
therefore wrong). For a fuller description of this process, see the
methodology annex.
There are three outcomes of this test: recall, precision and
overall. Each measures the ability of the classifier to make the
same decisions as a human – and thus its overall performance –
in a different way.
‘Recall’ describes the number of correct selections that the
classifier makes as a proportion of the total correct selections it
could have made. If there were ten relevant tweets in a dataset,
and a relevancy classifier successfully picks eight of them, it has a
recall score of 80 per cent
‘Precision’ describes the number of correct selections the
classifiers makes as a proportion of all the selections it has made.
If a relevancy classifier selects ten tweets as relevant, and eight of
them are indeed relevant, it has a precision score of 80 per cent.
The overall outcomes combine recall and precision, as all
classifiers are a trade-off between recall and precision. Classifiers
with a high recall score tend to be less precise, and vice versa.
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The overall score reconciles precision and recall to create one
overall measurement of performance for the classifier.
Ethics
Conducting research using Twitter data presents new ethical
challenges over how researchers should collect, store, analyse
and present publicly posted tweets. Because it is a new field of
research, there are no widely accepted protocols and approaches
for ethical social media research. Some useful recent guidance
has been issued by the ‘New Social Media, New Social Science’
network of social media researchers which recognises that a
number of outstanding ethical questions for research of this 
kind remain.17
The Economic and Social Research Council has six
principles of ethical research.18 After reviewing these principles,
we judged two to be important to consider in our research: (1)
whether informed consent is necessary, and (2) whether there are
possible harms to individual participants entailed.
Informed consent
Informed consent is widely understood to be required when
personal data are used and research subjects have an expecta-
tion of privacy. Determining whether research subjects can
reasonably expect privacy is important in both offline and 
online research contexts. How to do this is not simple. The
individual must expect the action – in this case a Tweet – to be
private and this expectation must be societally accepted as
objectively reasonable.
Within this frame, an important determinant of an
individual’s expectation of privacy on social media is by
reference to whether individuals have made any explicit effort or
decision in order to ensure that third parties cannot access the
information they provide there.
Applying these two tests to Twitter for our work, I believe
that there is, in general, a low level of expectation of privacy
among those who tweet publicly available messages. (This is not
true of all social networks.) Twitter’s terms of service and privacy
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policy state: ‘What you say on Twitter may be viewed all around
the world instantly’,19 and the terms of service explicitly
encourage re-use: ‘We encourage and permit broad re-use of
content. The Twitter API exists to enable this.’20 Societal
expectation of privacy on Twitter, I believe, is also relatively low
given recent court cases that have determined that tweets are
closely analogous to acts of publishing, and can thus also be
prosecuted under laws governing public communications,
including libel.21
Possible harms to individual participants
The chief burden on researchers is to make sure they are not
causing any likely harm to users, if those users have not given a
clear, informed, express consent that they might be identified. It
is difficult to measure harm in social media research. It was
judged that individual harm to participants was possible 
through quoting individual tweets – especially those that
contained a message that was critical, offensive, obscene or
represented a behaviour or attitude considered to be socially
deviant. While the tweet was public, and the user could not
reasonably expect it to be private (see above), it could be traced
back to the individual, possibly with negative consequences.
Other users might find simply having their details published
distressing or upsetting, especially if used in a context they had
not consented to.
There is material value to the research of directly quoting
social media. As a general principle, it is considered good
practice where possible to quote research subjects directly and
faithfully. This is because it is more accurate as a research
method and it allows other researchers to scrutinise and
potentially replicate your research work more closely. On
weighing these two concerns together, we determined to 
‘cloak’ direct quotes, given the sensitive subject matter and the
fact that precise, identifiable data were not materially important
for the rigour of the research work. Thus we retained the essence
of the data, but changed small parts so that no one could be
easily identified.22
Introduction
We did not cloak institutional accounts and those of public
figures with a large following, for two reasons. First, the accurate
description of how these kinds of accounts behave is particularly
important for the understanding of trust; second, because the
possibility of causing individual harm and the reasonable
expectation of privacy for public figures and institutions is likely
to be lower than for individuals.
17

2 Case studies
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Case study 1 Political trust
As its first case study, the report investigated the 30-minute
Twitter question-and-answer session hosted by Deputy Prime
Minister Nick Clegg at 12pm on Monday 26 June 2014. Called a
‘tweetchat’, the event was advertised as a chance for British
voters to ask the deputy prime minister about education policy.
It involved a number of questions being sent to Nick Clegg’s
Twitter account (@nick_clegg). Clegg then typically retweeted a
question, and then tweeted a response.
During the 30-minute duration of the tweetchat 2,946
tweets were posted containing ‘@nick_clegg’, which were
directed towards Nick Clegg’s Twitter account. Two classifiers
were built to analyse the dataset.
Tweets containing explicit statements of trust
The first classifier was trained to identify tweets that contained
explicit expressions of trust. To qualify for this category, the
tweet needed to contain an obvious, direct and clear statement of
trust or mistrust in Nick Clegg – the statements he made,
assurances he gave, and the facts, figures and claims that he
used. Examples of tweets in the explicit trust category include:
The difference is we have a liar as PM & another liar as DPM.
Do you regret breaking your promises, raising university fees, and generally
selling out to Tories?
How do u stop being seen as someone who’s [sic] promises are worthless?
#lameduck #liar
Any tweet that did not meet this criterion was categorised
as ‘not trust’.
The classifier judged 247 tweets to contain explicit
statements of trust, and 2,699 not to contain explicit statements
of trust.
Tweets containing explicit and implicit statements of trust
A second classifier was created to identify tweets that contained
not only explicit statements of trust or mistrust, but also
statements that implied or suggested the presence or absence of
trust. This wider category could include statements that
expressed quiet confidence or subtle doubt about the policies,
transparency or reliability of Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrats,
and/or the government. Examples of tweets that fell into the
implied trust category included:
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Watching @nick_clegg actually answering questions in civilised manner on
Twitter & @AlexSalmond full of rudeness & bluster at #fmq
Its [sic] the principle of the matter libdems wanted to abolish tution [sic] fees
yet they put it up.
Mr Clegg, you supported the Conservatives [sic] oppression of people with
disabilities. Flying a flag means nothing.
The classifier identified 710 tweets that contained
statements of explicit or implied trust, and 2,236 that did not.
Case study 2 Official trust
The second case study aimed to identify indicators of trust
directed towards an institution, department, process or official 
of the British Government. Government departments now
maintain a number of official Twitter accounts in order to
publicise and explain government policy, and to engage with
citizens, answer their questions, and provide clarification and
additional information.
Tweets were collected that contained the account name of
one of 11 official British Government Twitter accounts. Each
collected tweet either ‘mentioned’ the official account, usually in
order to comment about it, or was addressed to the official
account, often in order to pose a question or to address the
institution directly.
The official Twitter accounts selected for study were:
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· @ForeignOffice: the official and main Twitter account of the
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)
· @DECCgovuk: the account of the Department of Energy &
Climate Change (DECC)
· @FCOTravel: an account that provides consular assistance for
British nationals overseas
· @FCOHumanRights: the account of the Human Rights and
Communications Team at the FCO
· @SimonFraserFCO: the permanent under-secretary of the FCO
and head of the Diplomatic Service
· @end_svc: the account of the campaign Time to Act and the
Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict hosted by the
FCO in June 2014
· @UKUrdu: the FCO’s official account in Urdu
· @FMUnit: the account of the Forced Marriage Unit
@FCOClimate: the account of the Science, Innovation and
Climate Department within the FCO
@SudanUnit: the account of the Sudan Unit, based at the
FCO and the Department for International Development (DFID)
@LondonCyber: the account of the International Cyber
Policy Unit based at the FCO
Between 26 June and 18 July 2014 we collected 22,568
tweets that mentioned at least one of these accounts.
Identifying tweets related to trust from this sample was a
complex analytical task. A multi-stage method was used, and is
explained below. Overall, this method aimed to build NLP
classifiers to peel away successive layers of irrelevant data,
eventually producing a kernel of trust indicators.
Step 1 Filter language
Some tweets sent to one of the official accounts were not in
English and fell outside the scope of the report. We therefore
used a classifier that was trained to recognise tweets that
contained English language from all other tweets. This reduced
the initial sample from 22,568 to 21,408.
Step 2 Remove institutions
Inspection of the 21,408 tweets now in the dataset revealed that
many were sent from large institutional accounts – embassies,
large companies, schools and government departments. We
judged that these were unlikely to contain meaningful trust
indicators.
A classifier was created to filter out tweets sent from
institutions rather than individuals. Every tweet contains the
tweeter’s profile description as a piece of metadata – a short
paragraph where people often describe who they are. A classifier
was built to recognise the difference between profiles from
institutions, and those written by individuals.
An example of institutional accounts profile description is:
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The Chartered Institute of Public Relations is the professional body for PR
professionals with 10,000+ members in the UK. You’ll catch us on weekdays
8am–6pm.
An example of a non-institutional profile description is:
British. Teacher. May contain traces of Irishness. In Beirut.
The profile of each tweet was then classified on the basis 
of whether its creator was likely to be an individual. The
algorithm classified 10,902 tweets as produced from a non-
institutional account.
Step 3 Identify tweets containing an opinion
On inspection the dataset was divided between tweets that
contained an opinion or commentary – including judgements,
leading questions and non-neutral reportage – and those that did
not. Statements that are indicators of trust are necessarily
opinions. A classifier was therefore built to separate tweets that
contained an opinion from those that did not.
An example of a judgemental tweet is:
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I’m actually disgusted at my government right now. What a disgrace.
@foreignoffice
An example of a non-judgemental tweet is:
@foreignoffice international monitors say parts of the wreckage were
changed and cut into since they first saw them.
There were 6,383 tweets classified as containing a
judgement.
Step 4 Identify tweets directed towards the UK Government
Inspection of this dataset revealed that the opinions contained in
these tweets were directed at a large number of different objects.
A classifier was trained to identify tweets that were directed
towards a department or institution of the British Government.
An example of a tweet directed towards a government
institution is:
Shameless complicity @foreignoffice UK in the Gaza massacre. Hollow
words, craven kowtowing to Israeli state murder. Not in my name!
An example of a tweet not directed towards a government
institution is:
@TomsonSwarb @LBC @foreignoffice with military planes being shot down
in that area, it was suicidal for M Airlines to fly in that area.
Case studies
@foreignoffice You are acting outrageously. Im [sic] a UK citizen & I
demand FCO puts human rights FIRST & denounces#Bahrain regime’s
HR abuses.
@foreignoffice I am PROUD to be from a country that flies a rainbow flag
on one of it’s [sic] main government buildings @LondonLGBTPride
@foreignoffice Doubtful you care really, come on? Your government is
supporting fascist coup by Maidan nazis ther [sic].
There were 2,985 tweets identified as relevant to trust, 722
as not relevant to trust. At the end, therefore, approximately 10
per cent (2,263) of tweets from the original 22,568 tweets were
judged to be indicators of trust.
A random sample of 150 trust-indicator tweets were
qualitatively analysed to understand better the nature and kind
of trust that they contained (table 1).
Case study 3 Event-specific trust
The third case study focused on expressions of trust related to a
specific event. On 28 July 2014, the US delivered a letter written
There were 2,985 tweets classified as being directed towards
or that were about a department or institution of the Government.
Step 5 Identify tweets that contain an indicator of trust
At the final stage, the dataset consisted of 2,985 tweets that were
classified as in English, from an individual, containing an
opinion and directed towards the UK Government.
A final classifier was built to identify tweets that contained
a statement qualifying as either an explicit or implicit indicator
of trust in the government. This could include statements that
implied a level of confidence, or a lack thereof, in the policies,
transparency or reliability of the FCO, DECC or their
representatives.
Examples of ‘trust’ tweets include:
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Table 1 The categories a random sample of 150 tweets fell into, with
examples
Category Description Count Example
‘Abusive’ Contained insulting 50 @foreignoffice William
language. Targeted the Hague is a <expletive>!
FCO and William Hague; 
many related to Gaza. 
‘William Hague’ Focused on the news that 27 @WilliamJHague is a true 
Hague had been statesman. A real shame 
reshuffled, including that the country is losing 
congratulations and his service in 
wishes of luck. @foreignoffice.
‘Double Alluded to the double 24 @foreignoffice never see 
standards’ standards of British your sympathies expressed 
foreign policy. Majority to the families of 
focused on Gaza. Palestinians murdered by
the IDF. Why pray tell?
‘Gaza/Israel’ On FCO policy towards 18 I am disgusted beyond
the Israel–Palestine belief @foreignoffice latest 
conflict. Especially angry tweet blaming Palestinians
reaction to FCO tweet for Israel’s relentless 
that appeared to accept bombings!
the Israeli version of events.
‘Bahrain’ On FCO policy towards 15 @FCOHumanRights You do 
Bahrain – including NOT condemn torture in 
criticisms towards British #Bahrain. Instead, you
support for Bahrain, and support the Bahrain regime
requests for FCO to + allow alleged torturers 
maintain peace proactively. into UK. Why?
‘Miscellaneous Trust-relevant tweets that 8 @DECCgovuk I didn’t say 
trust’ do not fall into the other you have. I said the report 
categories. you commissioned and
published suggested that.
Have you read your own
report?
‘Praise’ These tweets praised 6 @DLidington 
the FCO. @foreignoffice Glad you are
there to support the birth
of a real democracy
#ukraine
‘Foreign policy’ These tweets related to 2 @foreignoffice 
general issues of foreign Stop covering up British 
policy, and touched on connivance in CIA torture 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the programme at Diego 
general behaviour of the Garcia. 
FCO.
by Barack Obama to the Russian Embassy containing the
allegation that Russia was violating the 1987 Intermediate
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This treaty mutually prohibits the
US and the USSR from developing, testing, possessing or
deploying intermediate-range (500–5,500km) ground-launched
ballistic and cruise missiles. A US State Department report
released shortly after the letter was delivered concluded that
Russia was violating the INF treaty by testing banned
intermediate-range, ground-launched missiles.23 The Russian
government denied the allegation. Subsequently, a series of
factually competing claims about the INF Treaty were made by
the US and Russian Governments, specialist NGOs, academic
experts and private citizens.
Six phrases were selected to identify tweets about the INF
treaty violation. These were: ‘INF treaty’, ‘nuclear missile treaty’,
‘1987 treaty’, ‘intermediate range nuclear forces treaty’, ‘missile
treaty’ and ‘nuclear arms treaty’. Between 6 and 19 August 2014,
743 tweets were collected that contained at least one of six
phrases. Almost all (99 per cent) of the tweets identified by these
phrases were relevant.
Very few tweets in this sample contained statements that
could be construed as relevant to trust. However, 693 (93 per
cent) of the collected tweets contained a link. This is a
significantly higher proportion of tweets with links than were
found in the other datasets collected for this report – typically
50–70 per cent.24 It is consistent with a key research finding of
Vox Digitas: Twitter is often used to share information rather than
express opinions. Datasets of tweets often contain a substantial
number of links to media stories, often with no additional
comment by the tweeter.25
Figure 1 illustrates the link-sharing behaviour within the
dataset. Each blue ball denotes a link that was shared, and the
size relates to the number of tweets sharing it. It shows that a
number of links were shared, many only a small number of
times, but a few at very great volume.
The links were analysed to study whether the content of the
shared article was relevant to the understanding of trust. Just
under two-thirds (469 or 63 per cent) of tweets shared links to
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articles that themselves disputed, questioned, supported or
confirmed the factual claims and statements made by either the
US or Russia. The most commonly shared news item, shared by
150 of the 743 tweets (under two URLs), was an article in Russia
Today entitled ‘US nuke accusations “part of infowar set to
discredit Russia” over Ukraine crisis’.26 That article contained an
interview with Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly
Antonov, and alleged that the US accusation was a deliberate act
of information warfare to undermine Russia’s reputation in the
context of the Ukraine crisis. The second most widely shared
item, with 32 shares, was an article on the consequences for the
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Figure 1 Link-sharing within the dataset on event-specific trust
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Table 2 The most frequently shared articles in the dataset on event-
specific trust
URL shared Title of news article Source Number
of 
shares
http://on.rt.com/5ku8ke ‘US nuke accusations “part Russia 124
of infowar set to discredit Today
Russia” over Ukraine crisis’
http://www.pism.pl/ ‘Russia’s violation of the Polish 32
publications/bulletin/ INF treaty: consequences Institute
no-107-702 for NATO’ of Inter-
national 
Affairs 
http://news.investors.com/ ‘Obama invited Russia Investors.com 26
ibd-editorials/072914- missile treaty violations’
710915-russia-violates-
1987-inf-missile-treaty.htm
http://rt.com/politics/ ‘US nuke accusations “part Russia 26
official-word/180136-inf- of infowar set to discredit Today
treaty-antonov-nuclear/ Russia” over Ukraine crisis’
http://nationalinterest.org/ ‘How to respond to Russia’s National 19
feature/how-respond- INF treaty violation’ Interest
russia%E2%80%99s-inf-
treaty-violation-11024
http://bit.ly/1sQRCSj ‘Intermediate-range nuclear Russia 17
forces treaty: setting the Today
record straight’
http://freebeacon.com/ ‘Destabilizing threat: Washington 16
national-security/ Russian cruise missile Free
destabilizing-threat/ violation of arms treaty a Beacon
“serious threat”’
http://on.rt.com/ur180e ‘Intermediate-range nuclear Russia 14
forces treaty: setting the Today
record straight’
http://ceip.org/1zTTUST ‘How to respond to Russia’s Carnegie 13
INF treaty violation’ Endowment 
for Inter-
national 
Peace
http://bit.ly/1emAxZu ‘US says Russia conducted Last Great 11
missile test banned by Stand
1987 treaty’
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of Russian
violations written for the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
The third most shared article was from Investors.com, written
from a US perspective, which was critical of what the author
perceived to be Obama’s weak reaction to the violation, shared
26 times (table 2).
The Russia Today account was, by a considerable margin,
the most followed Twitter account that posted a tweet within the
dataset on event-specific trust. Other accounts with a large
number of followers included Russia’s mission to NATO, and the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (figure 2).
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Figure 2 The most followed Twitter accounts within the dataset on
event-specific trust
While Russian-based accounts constituted a majority of the
followers within the dataset, the most prolific commentators
within the dataset were predominantly Western-based
institutions: ‘War on the Rocks’, a group of international security
commentators, the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program, a
(cloaked) American individual explicitly affiliated with
conservative politics, and the National Interest, a US international
affairs magazine (figure 3). Jacket Durkalec is an analyst at the
Polish Institute of International Affairs. PutinV_news is an
unofficial feed of news related to Vladimir Putin. Arms Control
Wonk (a US-based non-proliferation academic) and Arab News
contributed a large number of retweets, but did not post original
tweets themselves.
Case studies
Figure 3 The most prolific commentators within the dataset on event-
specific trust, and whether their retweets were 
true or false
3 Conclusion
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Data: do indicators of trust exist on social media?
The report considers the quantity, quality and kind of data on
Twitter that were identified to be related to trust. Throughout
three case studies, 26,257 tweets were collected and analysed, and
5,937 indicators of trust were found, of three different types:
explicit indicators of trust, implicit indicators of trust, and
sharing and following behaviour on Twitter relevant to trust
(table 3).
Explicit indicators of trust
These are the strongest, most definitive indications of the trust of
the tweeter. These were tweets that contained statements that
directly indicated a tweeter’s belief in the reliability, credibility or
ability of a person or institution. Tweets in this category typically
contained a small number of highly relevant terms – such as ‘liar’
or ‘trustworthy’. Only a small proportion of tweets – 247 – were
Table 3 Indicators of trust found in the tweets collected in the three
case studies
Case study Total tweets Explicit Implicit Shares and 
collected indicators of indicators of links indicating
trust (% of trust (% of trust (% of
total) total) total)
Political trust 2,946 247 (8.38%) 2,236 (75.9%) N/A
Official trust 22,568 N/A 2,985 (9.09%) N/A 
Event-based 
trust 743 N/A N/A 469 (63.12%)
Total 26,257 247 (0.94%) 5,221 (19.88%) 469 (1.79%)
identified to contain statements so directly and explicitly related
to trust.
Implicit indicators of trust
A much larger number of tweets – 5,221 – contained statements
that more broadly implied or suggested a level of trust. These
tweets represent weaker indicators of trust, where an inference or
interpretation has to be made by the analyst in order to associate
the statement with the tweeter’s beliefs about trust.
Sharing and following behaviour on Twitter relevant to trust
The findings from case study 3 implied that two important
behaviours on Twitter can be seen as relevant to trust: the act of
sharing tweets (through retweets) and the act of following an
account. Neither is a clear indication of trust. It is still unclear
why people are motivated to share the information that they do
on social media. People who use Twitter are likely to follow
accounts for a number of reasons, some related to trust and
some not. Some research suggests that we are most likely to
share information that elicits ‘high-arousal’ emotions, negative
and positive.27
There is some association between an individual’s sharing
behaviour, and the beliefs that they hold. Recent research from
the University of Western Ontario concluded that ‘content or
news items being shared must have value to the person or the
audience to whom it is directed’, and that the sharing of
information ‘is part of online identity construction, since sharing
is in a large part determined by how the content reflects on the
sharer’.28 However, both sharing and following behaviour on
Twitter are possibly valuable. They reflect the political
dimension of trust, and how it plays out on Twitter. Studying
‘information diffusion’, how messages and information spread
online, is a useful future avenue for the study of trust. Especially
in controversial circumstances where differing accounts exist,
trust is especially important.
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Features of the data
These were the main features of the data:
· Large amounts: 5,937 indicators of trust were found. Within the
limited context of a short report, this is a significant quantity of
relevant data – and larger than what could be gathered using
conventional sociological methods under the same time and
resource constraints.
· Real or near-real time: Relevant tweets were collected almost
immediately after they were posted. Automated techniques – like
digital observation – are capable of analysing tweets almost
immediately after they are collected. This opens the possibility of
analysing trust expressed in tweets in real time.29
· Reactive, event-specific and context-specific: It broadly emerged
throughout the case studies that tweets did not in general express
generic sentiment on Twitter about trust. A tweet is
overwhelmingly a reaction to an event that the tweeter has
otherwise encountered – either online or offline – in their lives.
Therefore expressions of trust were most often made in the
context of a specific event, at a specific time. This is notably
different from the generic and broad measurements of trust often
made by polls.
However:
· The relationship of this data with trust is inferential: The indicators of
trust found in the report were either statements that people had
made in tweets, or articles that people had shared. Both of these
kinds of data need to be interpreted before they can link to trust.
· The indicators are of varying degrees of quality: Only a relatively
small amount of data explicitly related to trust. A much wider
body of data implicitly did so. A greater amount of
interpretation is required to relate this wider body of data to
trust, and – like any interpretation – the link is contestable.
· Many tweets were adversarial: Most contained expressions
demonstrating lack of trust rather than trust. While it is possible
that this reflects genuine underlying attitudes, it is also possibly a
product of a ‘platform-specific effect’: an attribute of Twitter
itself (see below).
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Technology
In the course of any research it is important to be sure that what
is being measured is what is described as being measured; this is
called measurement veracity. In this context, it is important to
know whether it is possible to identify and measure indicators of
trust accurately and at great scale. The measurement of social
media, especially in very large quantities, is a young and rapidly
developing field of research that cannot have recourse to the
depth of literature and experience of other academic
methodologies, use cases or research contexts. Consequently, two
issues have been identified relevant to the accuracy of measuring
trust using digital observation: classifier performance and
probabilistic outcomes.
Classifier performance
A key consideration is whether the automated classifiers could
accurately identify the meaning of each tweet. On the basis of the
empirical tests carried out for this research, the average accuracy
of all the classifiers built and used for this paper is 84.8 per cent.
However, the accuracy of the classifiers was uneven. A
classifier could only reliably identify explicit indicators of trust
25 per cent of the time, and implied trust 63 per cent of the time
(see table 4), and was more accurate identifying irrelevant
material. This suggests that classifiers can usefully identify and
sort away irrelevant material, but where a high degree of
accuracy is required, automated analysis should not be the final
stage of the analysis. Manual verification would also be required.
Probabilistic outcomes
The products of digital observation produce inherently
probabilistic judgements. Any given indicator of trust has a
certain, measured chance of being present. This unavoidably
introduces uncertainty into the results that are produced.
Uncertainty increases when multiple classifiers are used
sequentially. This shift towards results with a measured
uncertainty is general in big data analysis.30 It demands new
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ways of caveating and communicating uncertainty that is clear to
the reader or research end-user.
Theory: does this research contribute to our
understanding of trust?
Overall, the study of trust on social media is a promising new
avenue for research. It allows the collection of large amounts of
data that can be used to understand trust in the context of
people’s lives and real time. However, it raises two broad issues
related to sociological practice and the study of attitudes. These
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Table 4 The accuracy of classifiers used in this study
Classifier Decision Precision Recall F-score
(%) (%) (%)
Tweet contains Explicit trust 46.7 17.1 25.0
explicit trust?
No explicit trust 91.2 97.8 94.4
Overall accuracy: 89.5%
Tweet contains Implied trust 64.1 63.1 63.6
explicit or implied No trust 89.8 90.2 90.0
trust? Overall accuracy: 84.3%
Tweet is from an Institutional 78.6 86.8 82.5
institution? Non-institutional 90.2 83.6 86.8
Overall accuracy: 84.9%
Tweet contains Judgemental 83.7 91.1 87.2
an opinion? Non-judgemental 90.2 82.2 86.0
Overall accuracy: 86.7%
Tweet contains an Towards 76.4 79.7 73.3
opinion about government
government? Not towards 
government 76.2 82.1 79.0
Overall accuracy: 77.8%
Tweet contains an  Trust 84.1 96.7 89.9
indicator of trust? Not trust 90.5 63.3 74.5
Overall accuracy: 85.6% 
are who the expressions of trust are produced by, and whether
they genuinely reflect an underlying attitude.
Trust of whom? Representivity
The beliefs that we hold, including trust, tend to reflect our
background and experiences; how old we are, what we do for a
job, where we live, and how much we earn. In conventional
studies of attitudes or beliefs, research is almost always based on
a sample of people that is carefully composed to represent a
broader group: a particular area, a certain age group, a social or
economic bracket, or the whole of the UK. Representivity is
crucial to allow results from a smaller group to be generalised
onto a larger one. It is a central facet of social science, and an
important part of modern polling and survey methodologies.
The data gathered for this report – and usually on Twitter
generally – are not representative of any identifiable group.
There are three reasons for this: Twitter does not represent
society, data gathered from Twitter may not represent the whole
of Twitter, and tweets may not represent Twitter users.
Twitter does not represent UK society, or global societies
Some kinds of people are much morel likely to use Twitter than
others. Research by Ipsos MORI has found that Twitter users
tend to be younger (especially between 15–34) and wealthier.
The oldest and poorest demographic groups are almost entirely
unrepresented on Twitter.31 This means that data gathered from
Twitter is likely to reflect the views of younger and richer
demographic groups, but not older and poorer ones.
The data gathered from Twitter may not represent the whole 
of Twitter
As the description of the methodology above explains, the report
relies on datasets of tweets that match certain keywords. There is
no way to ensure that these keywords identify all tweets that
relate to a particular individual, issue or event. Indeed, relevant
tweets that are not collected may differ in a relevant and
important way from those that do – both in the views they
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contain and in the backgrounds of the people that hold those
views. This is called systemic non-random bias. Data sampling
strategies that have it, such as those used in this paper, can
introduce skews into the analysis.
Tweets may not represent Twitter users
A small number of users are responsible for most Twitter activity.
Recent research by Nielsen found that 80 per cent of the time
spent on the site is accounted for by 7 per cent of ‘power’ Twitter
users.32 Gathered datasets of tweets reflect this: a
disproportionately high number of Tweets are likely to have been
sent by a small number of dedicated commentators or
campaigners on a related issue.
Genuine trust?
Crucial to any research method is the quality of the indicators
that are measured. The things that people share or say in tweets
must relate to genuine attitudes that they hold related to trust. A
number of issues are associated with this crucial link: deception,
platform effects and lack of context.
Deception
Twitter as a medium is subject to deception, deliberate and
otherwise. Twitter accounts and tweets can be generated
automatically. Twitter estimates that 5 per cent of its monthly
active users – 10.75 million – are fake.33 Independent researchers
have produced estimates that are twice as large.34 These fake
accounts are often linked to produce centrally controlled ‘bot’
networks, to produce large amounts of content without genuine
human involvement.35 This can be done for a number of
different reasons, as hoaxes and campaigns or for the purpose of
crime, spam, fraud and or as a deliberate attempt to misrepresent
the popularity of an issue online. It is difficult to provenance,
authenticate and therefore detect, track and predict deceptive
practice. Attempts to detect fake accounts dynamically interact
with counter-attempts to evade such detection. This sort of ‘arms
race’ continues to be an important area of research.36
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Platform effects
The intent, motivation, social signification, denotation and
connotation – the meaning – of any behaviour depends on the
situation and culture that it occurred within. Social media
platforms are new social contexts, with distinct norms, ways of
transacting and speaking. These exert ‘platform effects’ on the
message, and change how what is said should be interpreted. An
online ‘disinhibition effect’ is a well-evidenced influence on how
we act online. We are often ruder, more critical and less inhibited
in online forums than we are offline.37 Previous research
conducted by Demos demonstrates that Twitter is often used as a
way to critique or complain about those in positions of power. In
analysis we conducted for the Nigel Farage and Nick Clegg
debates of spring 2014 we found almost 90 per cent were
negative (irrespective of which candidate). We term this the
‘protest-platform’ phenomenon.38
Lack of context
Twitter is used to hold conversations with one or more other
discussants, as well as to broadcast to a wider viewership. A tweet
therefore may be a standalone statement, a response, or a
contribution within a longer conversation. The methodology
used in this report takes each tweet from its context, and treats it
as an isolated statement. This is likely to lead to misinterpre-
tations and errors in understanding what each tweet means 
and intends.
Moving forward
The report concludes with recommendations for how digital
observation should be deployed to better understand trust.
Use digital observation to study trust iteratively and in situ
The largest advantage of this technique is that it allows trust to
be measured constantly and in specific contexts. With all the
caveats and reservations that this report recognises, this is
nevertheless an important step forward from the occasional
polling of generic levels of trust. It presents the opportunity to
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study trust at scale and in the context of people’s everyday lives,
with all the nuances and detail that this entails.
Use digital observation to study trust related to events and in 
real time
Real-time research reflects the advantages of the method and the
way that Twitter is most often used. The ability to discern
reactions to events as soon as they occur is a powerful tool for
institutions to have. It allows them to be agile, and react quickly
to groundswells of anger, support or criticism quickly enough to
influence the underlying developments and events that drive
these attitudes.
Identify failures and crises of trust
The case studies suggested that people are more likely to use
Twitter as a protest platform – manifesting behaviours that
indicate a lack of trust rather than the presence of it. Digital
observation is therefore less useful to understand balances of
trust overall, and more useful to identify contexts and situations
where trust is most absent, or where it has suddenly and seriously
declined.
Use digital observation to augment polls on trust, not replace them
This report has identified that digital observation has both
important advantages and significant disadvantages in
comparison with conventional methods of studying trust. It
should be used alongside conventional methods to augment 
and widen how we understand trust, in real-time, in specific
contexts, and in reaction to events. However, in the face of a
number of stiff challenges to credibility, digital observation
should be cross-referenced and compared with results produced
by more methodologically mature forms of offline research. 
The comparisons – whether as overlays, correlations or 
simply reporting that can be read side-by-side – can be used 
to contextualise the robustness of findings from digital 
observation alone.
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Consider digital observation to be a long-term prospect
Digital observation is a new and rapidly developing research
method. Its capability, accuracy and importance are likely to
change rapidly in the future, given the growth of social media,
developments in the technologies used to study social media,
and improvements in social media research methods.
The growth of social media
Driven by increasing affordability and ease of access, Internet
and social media use is increasing rapidly. 39 Twitter specifically
has been the fastest growing social media platform in the
world.40 The annual growth of Twitter is expected to decrease
over time, by 24.4 per cent in 2014, 15.1 per cent in 2016, and 10.7
per cent in 2018, when it is expected that Twitter will have 400
million users (compared with around 200 million active users in
2014).41
In addition, the fastest growing demographics on Twitter
are the ones currently least represented. The number of users
aged between 55 and 64 grew 79% between 2012 and 2013 –
proportionately more than any other.42 This growth is likely, over
time, to make Twitter increasingly representative of both UK
society, and of the global population. However, the future user
bases of specific social media platforms are volatile and difficult
to predict accurately. MySpace was once the largest social media
site in the world with 75.9 million regular users.43 It now has
only 36 million, and has been far surpassed by other platforms,
most notably Facebook, which has over 1 billion users.44
Rapid developments of natural language processing
The ability of automated, computer-based technologies to
understand natural language – such as Tweets – is increasing
rapidly. Improvements in hardware and data storage are allowing
unprecedented amounts of data to be leveraged to train
computers to establish the meaning of language accurately. A
sub-field of NLP – distributional semantics – is now producing
‘deep learning’ techniques, modelled on the human brain. Multi-
modal techniques are beginning to be able to understand
meaning across different formats, including film and pictures as
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well as text. The result is that the technological aspects of digital
observation are likely to significantly increase in accuracy within
the next five years.
Improvements in social media research method
There are significant attempts to improve social media research
frameworks to make them better reflect the principles of
sociological good practice. The UK’s academic research councils
are making significant investments in the development of
methods to understand social media rigorously.45 As an example,
Demos, the University of Sussex and Ipsos MORI have begun a
major project – ‘In the Hands of the Analyst’ – to make develop
methodologies capable of studying attitudes on social media in a
representative way.46
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Data collection
All data from Twitter were collected from its application
programming interfaces (APIs). Twitter has three different APIs
that are available to researchers.
· search API: return a collection of relevant tweets matching a
specified query (word match) from an index that extends up to
roughly a week in the past
· stream API: continually produce tweets that contain one of a
number of keywords to the researcher, in real time as they 
are made
· sample API: return a small number (approximately 1 per cent) of
all public tweets in real time
Each of these APIs (consistent with the vast majority of all
social media platform APIs) is constrained – or ‘rate-limited’ –
by the amount of data they will return. This limit was not
exceeded by any collection used in this report.
Data analysis
Natural language processing
The amount of Twitter data collected was too large to be
analysed manually or understood in its totality. Natural language
that occurs on social media can be automatically understood at
great scale and speed using NLP. A long-established sub-field of
artificial intelligence research, NLP combines approaches
developed in the fields of computer science, applied mathematics
and linguistics. It is increasingly used as an analytical ‘window’
into big datasets, such as the ones collected for this report.
The value of NLP in the context of this work is its ability to
create classifiers, which are algorithms that automatically place
tweets in one of a number of pre-defined categories of meaning.
To build classifiers, the study uses a web-hosted software
platform, developed by the project team, called Method51. This
uses NLP technology to allow researchers to construct bespoke
classifiers rapidly to sort defined bodies of tweets into categories
(defined by the analyst). The process to create each classifier was
to go through the following phases. Each phase is undertaken
via a user interface within Method51.
Phase 1 Define categories
The formal criteria explaining how tweets should be annotated is
developed by defining between two and five categories within
which the classifier will try to place each (and every) tweet. The
exact definition of the categories develops throughout the early
interaction of the data. The categories are not arrived at a priori,
but only through an iterative interaction with the data – wherein
the definition of each category can be challenged by the actual
data. This is to ensure that the categories reflect the evidence
rather than the preconceptions or expectations of the analyst.
This is consistent with a well-known sociological method called
grounded theory.47
Phase 2 Create a gold-standard test dataset
This phase provides a baseline of truth against which the
classifier performance is tested. A number of tweets (usually 100,
but more are selected if the dataset is very large) are randomly
chosen to form a gold-standard test set. These are manually
coded into the categories defined during phase 1. These tweets
are then removed from the main dataset, and are not used to
train the classifier in phase 3.
Phase 3 Train
This is the process wherein training data are introduced into the
statistical model, called ‘mark up’. Through a process called
‘active learning’, each unlabelled tweet in the dataset is assessed
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by the classifier for the level of confidence it has that the tweet is
in the correct category. The classifier selects the tweets with the
lowest confidence score, and these are presented to the human
analyst via a user interface of Method51. The analyst reads each
tweet, and decides which of the pre-assigned categories (see
phase 1) that it should belong to. When ten have been selected,
they are submitted as training data, and the NLP model is
recalculated. The NLP algorithm looks for statistical correlations
between the language used and the meaning expressed to arrive
at a series of rules-based criteria.
Phase 4 Review and modify performance
The updated classifier is then used to classify each tweet within
the gold-standard test set. The decisions made by the classifier
are compared with the decisions made (in phase 2) by the human
analyst. On the basis of this comparison, classifier performance
statistics – ‘recall’, ‘precision’ and ‘overall’ (see ‘The assessment
of classifiers’, in chapter 1) – are created and appraised by a
human analyst.
Phase 5 Retrain
Phases 3 and 4 are iteratively repeated until classifier
performance ceases to increase. This state is called ‘plateau’, and,
when reached, is considered the practical optimum performance
that a classifier can reasonably reach. Plateau typically occurs
within 200–300 of annotated tweets, although it depends on the
scenario: the more complex the task, the more training data that
are required.
Phase 6 Process
When the classifier performance has reached a plateau, the NLP
model is used to process all the remaining tweets in the dataset
into the categories defined during phase 1 along the same,
inferred, lines as the examples it has been given. Processing
creates a series of new databases – one for each category of
meaning – each containing the tweets considered by the model
to be most likely to fall within that category.
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Phase 7 Create a new classifier (phase 1), or post-processing
analysis (phase 9)
Practically, classifiers are built to work together. Each is able to
perform a fairly simple task at a very large scale: to filter relevant
tweets from irrelevant ones, to sort tweets into broad category of
meanings, or to separate tweets containing one kind of key
message with those containing another. When classifiers work
together, they are called a ‘cascade’. Cascades of classifiers were
used for case studies two and three. After phase 7 is completed, a
decision is made about whether to return to phase 1 to construct
the next classifier within the cascade, or, if the cascade if complete,
to move to the final phase – phase 8, post-processing analysis.
Phase 8 Carry out post-processing analysis
After tweets have been processed, the new datasets are often
analysed and assessed using a variety of other techniques. 
These are:
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· Metadata analysis: There are around 150 pieces of metadata
attached to every tweet. They include information about the
tweeter, such as their public profile, the number of followers they
have, and their screen name; about the tweet’s context, such as
whether it was a retweet, or a reply; possible geographic
information about where the tweet was sent from, or where the
tweeter has stated they are from; and whether the tweet contains
objects like links, hashtags or media content. The metadata of
processed datasets are often analysed to understand better their
nature and meaning, such as the most retweeted tweets, the users
with the most followers, and geographic distributions of tweets.
· Time series analysis: The datasets are often graphed over time in
order to understand their relationship to offline events, and to
identify significant moments when volume sharply increased or
decreased.
· Qualitative analysis: a random sample of tweets is often drawn from
processed datasets and analysed using qualitative sociological
coding methodologies. These techniques attempt to draw out the
detail, nuances and subtleties of meaning contained within the
dataset, which automated analysis is not able to identify.
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“Researching Twitter 
can transform how 
we understand trust…”
A QUESTION OF TRUST
Carl Miller
Well-placed trust is a vital social good. It is foundational to a
healthy democracy, and necessary for human beings to work
confidently with one another. A lack of trust increases social
frictions and collective endeavour. Understanding trust is
vital to understand society: to know how messages are
received, how organisations and processes are interacted 
with, and why – individually and collectively – we make 
the choices and live the lives that we do. It is an important
part of social science, and a vital requirement of informed
public policy. 
We have long tried to measure and understand trust:
major national polls have measured trust in politicians,
organisations and the professions for decades. But these
techniques are criticised for only measuring trust as an
abstract and general thing: trust is often highly contextual
and dependent on situation. The rise of social media offers an
opportunity to study trust in a new way. As we use new digital
platforms, we create large new bodies of information about
what we think, what we experience and who we are. A
burgeoning new discipline – social media science – attempts
to rigorously and ethically research social media to
understand society. 
This report uses new technologies and research methods
to ask whether the study of Twitter can allow us to
understand trust more contextually, constantly and ethically.
It scopes the quality and quantity of trust-relevant data on
Twitter, the ability of emerging technologies to accurately
measure them, and, overall, whether this new form of research
can add to our understanding of trust, and how it relates to
the standard principles of good research and sound evidence. 
Carl Miller is Research Director at the Centre for the Analysis
of Social Media at Demos. 
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